

RELEASED IN PART  
1.4(D)

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EB-01	FBIE-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-10	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01
	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/032W	
-----B558E6 281611Z /38							

P 281605Z MAR 95  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0373  
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 000931

E.O. 12356: NA  
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, MOPS, PHUM, UN, RW  
SUBJECT: UNAMIR FORCECOM TOUSIGNANT  
ON UNAMIR'S FUTURE ROLE

REF: A) STATE 69924, B) RECENT DATT REPORTING

1. C -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR, ACTING DCM, AND DATT CALLED ON  
UNAMIR FORCECOM MG TOUSIGNANT MARCH 28 IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
REFTEL INSTRUCTIONS. TOUSIGNANT SPOKE OF DISAGREEMENTS  
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WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND WITHIN THE RPA; OF GROWING

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR  
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)  
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 APR 2015  
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAY 2005 200103014

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TENSION THROUGHOUT RWANDA; OF THE INADEQUACY OF THE UNAMIR MANDATE TO DEAL WITH THE POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION WHICH NOW EXISTS; AND OF HOW UNAMIR CAN MOST CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION IN RWANDA. HIS ASSESSMENT IS THAT SOME CONTINUED UNAMIR PRESENCE IS A NECESSITY, IF ONLY AS A SYMBOLIC REASSURANCE, BUT THAT TO BE EFFECTIVE UNAMIR'S MANDATE NEEDS TO BE RETOOLED. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT GOR DISPLEASURE OVER THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN GOMA WOULD SHORTLY LEAD TO A SHUTDOWN OF THE WFP FOOD PIPELINE. END SUMMARY.

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OUR WORK AND WHY WE DO IT  
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3. TOUSIGNANT BELIEVES THAT UNAMIR PROVIDES A NECESSARY SENSE OF SECURITY IN RWANDA -- [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] HOWEVER, UNAMIR'S PRESENCE IS REASSURING TO MANY PEOPLE WHO WOULD LEAVE RWANDA AS, OR EVEN BEFORE, UNAMIR WITHDREW. BUT THAT SENSE OF SECURITY IS NOT ENOUGH TO KEEP UNAMIR EFFECTIVE. TOUSIGNANT EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOME OF WHAT UNAMIR IS NOW DOING UNDER ITS "CIVILIANS AT RISK" MANDATE. HE SUGGESTED THAT IF UNAMIR MOVES PEOPLE TO COMMUNES IN SAFETY, BUT 1300 A WEEK ARE BEING ARRESTED AND PUT IN OVERCROWDED PRISONS WHERE THEIR LIVES ARE AT RISK, THEN UNAMIR MAY BE ACTING ILLEGALLY, VIOLATING ITS OWN MANDATE. PROBLEMS SUCH AS THIS ONE NEED, HE SAID, TO BE CLARIFIED.

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4. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE PRESENT SITUATION, WHERE THE NATIONAL CONTINGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO COVER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY WITHOUT SPECIFIC PATROLLING AND SECURITY DUTIES, REDUCES THEM TO GARRISON STATUS AND THE TROOPS BECOME TOO COMPLACENT. [REDACTED]

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5. "WE FEEL VERY FRUSTRATED ABOUT THE SITUATION NOW AND THE LACK OF DIRECTION, BUT WE'RE NOT COMFORTABLE ABOUT PULLING OUT," TOUSIGNANT SAID. UNAMIR'S OPERATING MANDATE, HE SAID, HAD ALREADY CHANGED AS THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CHANGED -- BEFORE AND AFTER THE GENOCIDE AND WAR OF APRIL-JULY 94. TO RESTRUCTURE THE MANDATE, TOUSIGNANT WOULD MAINTAIN SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND EMPHASIZE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

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HE SAID THAT UNAMIR COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND PROTECTION OF MAGISTRATES, TRIBUNALS, AND  
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HUMAN RIGHTS TEAMS. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF UNAMIR IS APPROPRIATE FOR THIS ROLE, HE SAID. "I THINK WE SHOULD STAY UNTIL AT LEAST DECEMBER 1995, BUT TELL US WHAT WE ARE SUPPOSED TO DO."

6. TOUSIGNANT TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON UNAMIR'S REGIONAL POTENTIAL. HE CANNOT AT PRESENT CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH GOR FORCES ON INSURGENCY CHALLENGES. HOWEVER, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO IF HIS MANDATE WERE TO INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL SECURITY. HE SAID THAT HIS PLANNERS HAD BEEN STUDYING WAYS TO REACT TO THE CRISIS IN BURUNDI, SHOULD UNAMIR BE CALLED UPON.

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SLOW JUSTICE AND A FRAGILE GOVERNMENT  
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7. TOUSIGNANT EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION OVER THE TARDINESS OF DONOR REACTION TO THE CRISIS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

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EVERYONE, HE SAID, TALKS ABOUT IT BUT NO ONE DOES  
ANYTHING ABOUT IT. THE PROBLEM OF THE DELAY IN STARTING  
UP THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IS JUST ADDING TO THE LIST  
OF THINGS UNDELIVERED

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-----B558F2 281612Z /38							

P 281605Z MAR 95  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0374  
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 000931

E.O.12356: NA  
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PRIME MINISTER UNDER ATTACK  
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8. THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF IS UNDER ATTACK,  
TOUSIGNANT SAID, [REDACTED]

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GOR DOESN'T KEEP ITS PROMISES, EITHER  
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9. TOUSIGNANT OBSERVED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY  
HAD BEEN SLOW IN DELIVERING ON ITS PROMISES OF AID, BUT  
THAT THE GOR WAS INCREASINGLY IGNORING THE STATUS OF  
MISSION AGREEMENT (SOMA) GOVERNING THE UNAMIR OPERATIONS  
AND PERSONNEL. CARS WERE BEING SEARCHED, PERSONNEL

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DETAINED, SHIPMENTS DELAYED FOR NO APPARENT REASON AND IN  
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COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE SOMA. IT WAS BECOMING MORE AND  
MORE CLEAR THAT THE RPA, THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE,  
IS THE ONLY POWER IN THE GOR. OTHER MINISTRIES CAN ISSUE  
ANY PAPER THEY WANT, BUT ONLY AN OKAY FROM THE MINISTRY  
OF DEFENSE IS REAL CURRENCY. AND WHEN THEY DON'T WANT TO  
OOPERATE, TOUSIGNANT FINDS THAT HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE  
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SIMPLY DISAPPEAR AND CAN'T BE FOUND  
TO RETURN A CALL OR TAKE A MEETING.

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COMMENT  
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10. TOUSIGNANT'S VIEWS ON UNAMIR'S FUTURE FALL WELL  
WITHIN THE CONSENSUS VIEW IN KIGALI'S DIPLOMATIC  
COMMUNITY THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE  
IS DESIRABLE HERE AND WILL BE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. HIS  
DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING A MISSION, HOWEVER, POINTS OUT  
JUST HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO SAY EXACTLY WHAT UNAMIR CAN  
DO TO HELP. UNAMIR'S PRESENCE IN RWANDA, AND ESPECIALLY  
IN KIGALI, IS HUGE AND INESCAPABLE, AND IT IS NOT  
SURPRISING THAT THE RPA SHOULD CHAFE AT THE THEIR BETTER  
PAID, BETTER EQUIPPED UNAMIR COLLEAGUES. ACCORDING TO  
TOUSIGNANT, ONE THING THAT KEEPS THE RPA FROM INSISTING  
ON IMMEDIATE UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL IS THAT THE RPA, ALREADY  
STRETCHED TO THE LIMIT BY INFILTRATIONS ACROSS THE  
BORDERS FROM ZAIRE, BURUNDI, AND TANZANIA, SEES UNAMIR AS  
A DETERRENT TO OUTRIGHT INVASION BY EX-FAR UNITS.

11. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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12. ON INSTABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE GOR:  
TOUSIGNAMT'S VIEWS ARE ILLUMINATING AND PARALLEL WHAT WE  
HABV HEARD ABOUT MANEUVERING AND INFIGHTING WITHIN THE  
GOVERNMENT. RECENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND  
PRIME MINISTER ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE SHOWED  
THAT THERE WAS NO UNITY OF OPINION WITHIN THE GOR ON THIS  
MOST PRESSING AND CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. SHOULD THE PRIME  
MINISTER GO, HE WOULD TAKE WITH HIM THE LEGITIMACY OF  
ARUSHA, WHICH, RIGHT OR WRONG, NAMES HIM PERSONALLY TO  
THE POST. NONETHELESS, PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU TOLD US LAST  
WBEK THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE ARUSHA ACCORD THE  
FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE LAND. WE NEED TO THINK ABOUT  
WHETHBR THE RWAMDAN GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO ARUSHA  
PROVIDES MERE WINDOW DRESSING AND WHETHER THAT MATTERS TO  
U.S. POLICY. IF WE END UP WITH A REGIME INCREASINGLY  
CONTROLLED BY THE RPF AND ITS MILITARY WING, WOULD THAT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0375  
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE

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VITIATE OUR MISSION OF JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE IN RWANDA?

13. RBTHINKING THE UNAMIR MANDATE IS NOT INDICATIVE THAT UNAMIR HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS, BUT RATHER THAT UNAMIR IS ADAPTING TO THE NEEDS ON THE GROUND. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT UNAMIR SHOULD STAY. ADDING PROTECTION OF MAGISTRATES TO THE MANDATE SEEMS A LOGICAL EXTENSION OF  
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PROTECTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AND THE CURRENT FOCUS ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. CREATING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR REFUGEE RETURN IS IMPLICIT IN UNAMIR'S MANDATE, BUT ITS FORCE AND PRESENCE SO FAR HAVE NOT EFFECTIVELY COUNTERED FACTORS OF INTIMIDATION IN THE CAMPS AND INSECURITY AT HOME. WHETHER UNAMIR SHOULD TAKE ON A REGIONAL ROLE MAY BE A MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE GIVEN SENSITIVITIES OF ADJOINING STATES AND NEIGHBORING UN OPERATIONS.

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14. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT ROLE A MILITARY FORCE CAN SERVE IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, BUT THE POLITICAL WING OF UNAMIR COULD BE MORE ACTIVE IN THIS REGARD THAN THEY HAVE BEEN, AND NEED THE MILITARY PRESENCE TO REINFORCE THEM. IF THE POLITICAL WING OF UNAMIR CANNOT ENERGIZE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS, HOWEVER, UNAMIR SHOULD NOT SIMPLY SLAP "RECONCILIATION" ONTO AN OTHERWISE INADEQUATE MANDATE, FOR THE INEVITABLE FAILURE TO DELIVER WILL SIMPLY PUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS INTO QUESTION ONCE AGAIN. BOTH SRSG KHAN AND FORCE COMMANDER BELIEVE THAT THE FORMED FORCE, RATHER THAN OBSERVERS AND CIVILIAN POLICE, MUST BE THE NECESSARY BULWARK, WHATEVER MANDATE IS GIVEN. IF THAT IS THE CASE, THE SIZE, EXPERTISE AND OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE FORCE BECOMES A CRITICAL PART OF OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE UN ON MANDATE RENEWAL. RAWSON

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